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AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCTRINE
OF SUBROGATION:
THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE 11*
M. L. MARASINGHE**
In part one of this article' the historical evolution of subrogation until the chancellorship of Lord Hardwicke was examined.
His decision in Randal v. Cockran2 marked its identification with
equity. Hardwicke, in his opinion, suggested a possible theoretical
basis for the doctrine and a justification for the role of equity in
the area of contribution. However, that equity courts were responsible for holding that contribution was applicable in situations
devoid of anything akin to a cession of action appears to have
been overwhelmingly accepted.
Hardwicke seems to have realized the importance of the steps
taken by equity in the area of contribution during his chancellorship. In a letter to Lord Kames,3 Hardwicke noted that new commercial conditions, new methods of dealing with property, and
different forms of property made it necessary for equity to play
a novel part in the further development of subrogation.' In this
role equity had begun to introduce rules into the law for which
precedents could be found neither in its own decisions nor in
the common law. Commenting on Hardwicke's letter, Holdsworth
wrote:
These principles were acted upon by Hardwicke and by
his predecessors, with the result that, during the first
half of the 18th Century, Equity was more receptive of
new ideas, and therefore more progressive, than the Com*1 wish to acknowledge the most helpful discussions I had with Professor Maurice Millner of University College, London, during the formative
stages of this work. Further, I am grateful to my colleague Professor
Robert Hane for reading the manuscript and suggesting a number of pertinent alterations.
**L.L.B. (Lond.), L.L.M. (Lond.); Barrister of Law at the Inner Temple;
Barrister and Solicitor of the Province of Ontario, Canada, and Professor of
Law at the University of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.

1. See 10 VAL. U.L. Rsv. 45 (1975).
2.
3.

1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748).
Quoted in full in 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 466-67

(1927).
4. Id.
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mon Law. It was not until Lord Mansfield, who boasted
that he was Hardwicke's pupil, became Chief Justice that
the Common Law showed itself able and willing to adapt
itself to a changing world by the adoption of some of
those rational principles, by means of which Hardwicke
and his predecessors had been developing the system of
Equity.'
IMPLICIT APPLICATION OF

Randal IN

THE

COMMON LAW COURTS

In Randal, the basis advanced by Lord Hardwicke for the
ipso jure transference of rights unquestionably used in equity,
was readily accepted by the common law courts. In fact, in a decision by Lord Mansfield, the principle as it had been used in
equity was succinctly stated: "Every day the insurer is put in
the place of the assured ....

The insurer uses the name of the

insured."6
Several cases illustrate the common law courts' use of the
doctrine of subrogation which had been fashioned in equity. London Assurance Co. v. Sainsbury' was decided in a common law
court. The insurer paid the assured for a loss arising out of civil
riots. Applying a statute which gave the insurer a right of recovery, he sued the municipality ("the hundred") to recover the
payment made to the assured. Notwithstanding the prior payment, the assured claimed that he was entitled to any recovery
the insurer received from the city.
Denying the assured's claim, three judges wrote separate
opinions, all of which relied on Randal at least in theory. Justice
Ashurst, having raised the question whether the insurer after
having paid the assured could recover from the tortfeasors, answered in the affirmative:
Can the owner, after being paid by the insured, recover
against the trespasser? Certainly he can. So he may
against the hundred [the city]; and when he recovers he
is a trustee for the insurer.8
Another judge also relied on the trust concept when he noted that
"an action by the insured, as trustee, would be a bar to an action
5.

12 HOLsWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 260 (1938).

6. 3 Doug. 61, 64, 99 Eng. Rep. 538, 540 (1782).
7. 3 Doug. 245, 99 Eng. Rep. 636 (1783).
8. Id. at 252, 99 Eng. Rep. at 640 (emphasis added).
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by the insurer. So a collusive release might be got over." Thus,
it is clear from London Assurance Co. that the trust concept enunciated in Randal was now equally applicable at common law.
Lord Mansfield's opinion, in which he dissented on a factual
question but concurred on the appropriate legal principles, stressed
the ipso lure transference of rights from the payee to the payor
at payment.
The care of a sheriff who has paid the whole debt is very
strong, for he stands in the place of the debtor, by act of
Law; yet he must sue in the name of the plaintiff.'
London Assurance Co. v. Sainsbury'" settles three issues for
both the common law courts and the courts of equity. In suits for
contribution, (1) the trust concept enables the insurer to sue a
tortfeasor of the assured once the payment was made pursuant to
the policy;" (2) such an action must be brought in the name of
the assured;2 and (3) the subrogation process occurs by operation of law. London Assurance Co. took the principles of subrogation established by equity and forged them into the common
law. However, the common law also assumed a major role in
fashioning the future progress of the purely equitable doctrine.
In Lawson v. Wright,'" the plaintiff, who was the executor
of a surety who had paid the entire debt, claimed a contribution
from a co-surety. The court permitted the plaintiff's claim basing
his right in equity. He was said to have "a right to call on another for contribution in cases of this nature . . . [since] the origin of the courts of Equity ... .""' A contemporaneous decision
in the Court of Exchequer' 5 indicates further the purely equitable
foundation for the doctrine. The basis of "bottom of contribution" was said to be "a fixed principle of Justice, and is not
founded in Contract."'6 Later, in the same opinion, it was noted
that,
9. Id. at 253, 99 Eng. Rep. at 640 (emphasis added).
10. 3 Doug. 61, 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (1782).
11. See Mason v. Sainsbury, 3 Doug. 61, 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (1782), in

which Lord Mansfield avoids reference to the trust concept.
12.
13.

See Lister v. Romford Ice Co., [1956J 2 Q.B. 180 (C.A. 1955).
1 Cox. 275, 29 Eng. Rep. 1164 (1786). See also Hodgin, Subrogation

in Insurance Law, 1975 J. Bus. L. 114.
14. Id.at 276, 29 Eng. Rep. at 1164.
15. Deering v. Winchelsea, 2 Bos. & Pul. 270, 126 Eng. Rep. 1276 (1787).
16.

Id. at 272, 126 Eng. Rep. at 1277 (emphasis added).
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[t]his contribution is considered as founded in Equity;
Contract is not mentioned. The principle operates more
clearly in a Court of Equity than at Law. At Law the
party is driven to an Audita Querela or Seire Facias to
defeat the execution, and compel execution to be taken
against all. 7
This court clearly saw a distinct difference between how contribution was sought at equity and at law.
The arguments presented in Lawson" formed the basis for a
theory advanced by the Solicitor General in Rogers v. Mackenzie."
It raised an issue of contribution of two sureties. In adopting the
Solicitor General's argument, the court held that as a,
general principle of Law .

.

. when one surety pays the

whole debt, there shall be a contribution. Sir Edward
Deering v. Lord Winchelsea . . . and Praed v. Gardner.
• .. It is unjust to throw the whole burden on one estate.

They are bound to the Crown jointly and severally. Their
several estates are therefore equally liable. By accident
they are unequally charged. To correct that inequality is
within the principle, upon which the court compels contribution. .

...

o

By the end of the eighteenth century, both the common law
and the equity courts appeared thoroughly accustomed to applying this equitable doctrine. The accepted doctrine had now developed so that a person who had paid a third party in discharge
of another's obligation to him, acquired from that third party a
right to sue that other person, upon whom lay the primary obligation to pay, for a contribution or for an indemnity. When the
claim was made among joint sureties and where the claim was
limited to a portion of the payment, the claim from the primary
obligor would be in the nature of a "contribution." However,
under a contract of insurance, where the full amount was claimed
it would be in the nature of an "indemnity," and the process was
referred to as "subrogation."
Whichever label was used, by the beginning of the nineteenth
century three elements had become abundantly clear:
17.
18.

Id. at 273, 126 Eng. Rep. at 1278.
The Solicitor General also relied upon Praed v. Gardiner, 2 Cox. 86,

30 Eng. Rep. 40 (1788).
19. 4 Ves. jun. 752, 31 Eng. Rep. 389 (1799).

20.

Id. at 755, 31 Eng. Rep. at 391.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/4

Marasinghe: An Historical Introduction to the Doctrine of Subrogation: The Ea

19761

DOCTRINE OF SUBROGATION

(1) The person making the payment to the third party
was recognized as having acquired at the moment of paying, a right to claim a contribution or an indemnity (as
the case might be) from the principal obligor;
(2) The acquisition of that right did not result from an
express agreement to transfer such right, which the third
party had against the principal obligor; and,
(3) It was accepted by both the common law courts and
the courts of equity that this acquisition of rights against
the principal obligor was an operation of equity, and not
of the common law.
EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO

Randal

The eighteenth century marked the establishment of a theoretical justification for the role which equity had assumed in the
area of contribution. However, not until the nineteenth century
was a name given to the process introduced by equity. In Craythorn v. Swinburn,2" the court explained the grounds upon which
the courts of law could justify the application of equitable rules
in the field of contribution:
It has been long settled that, if there are co-sureties by
the same instrument, and the creditor calls upon either
of them to pay the principal debt, or any part of it, that
surety has a right in this Court, either upon a principle
of Equity, or upon Contract, to call upon his co-surety
for contribution; and I think, that right is properly
enough stated as depending rather upon a principle of
Equity than upon Contract: unless in this sense; that,
the principle of Equity being in its operation established,
a Contract may be inferred upon the implied knowledge
of that principle by all persons, and it must be upon such
a ground of implied assumpsit, that in modern times
Courts of Law have assumed a jurisdiction upon this

subject.2
21. 14 Ves. jun. 160, 33 Eng. Rep. 482 (1807). See also Ex parte Gifford, 6 Ves. jun. 805, 31 Eng. Rep. 1318 (1802), in which the court repeated
what had been stated before, namely, that the surety, after payment, has "a
clear equitable remedy to stand in the place of the creditor ...." Id. at 807,
31 Eng. Rep. at 1319.
22. 14 Ves. jun. 160, 164, 33 Eng. Rep. 482, 483-84 (1807).
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This explanation, it appears, was the only attempt ever made to
justify what for Lord Mansfield was a daily occurrence" in the
common law courts. It must be stressed that the application of the
equitable doctrine of contribution in the common law courts seems
to have been utilized without any explicit reference to Randal or
any explanation as to how it became part of the common law.
Nevertheless, in Sterling v. Forrester," the court recognized that
the equitable remedy was applicable both in the courts of equity
and at common law. Having stated that in equity a surety of a
bankrupt could, after making a payment, stand as a cestui que
trust to the extent of that payment, the court added:
Formerly it was thought that the remedy was only in
Equity (Toussaint v. Martinnant, 2 T.R. 105) but in that
case it was held, that if one in the nature of surety has
paid a debt, he might bring an action against the parties
liable for the debt. Until I became acquainted with that
case, I thought the remedy must be in Equity.2 5
From Crayton and Sterling it appears that a contractual remedy
may arise out of a principle in equity and that its application in
the common law courts would then be justified on the grounds of
an implied assumpsit. It was not clear, however, that the common law could handle the administration of this new doctrine.
Baron Parke, in Davies v. Humphries,6 made the point that the
common law had "assumed jurisdiction over this subject," because
he believed that the common law would be unable to do full justice
between the parties when applying this new doctrine.2
Aside from those hesitations, the post-Hardwicke era consistently and continuously strengthened the right of equity to put
the insurer in the place of the assured, and the surety in the place
of the creditor, provided that the insurer and the surety in each
23.
24.
25.
26.

See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
3 Bli. 575, 4 Eng. Rep. 712 (1821).
Id. at 590, 4 Eng. Rep. at 717.
6 M.&W. 153, 151 Eng. Rep. 361 (1840).

27.
This right is founded not originally upon contract, but upon a principle of Equity, though it is now established to be the foundation of

the action, as appears by the cases of Cowell v. Edward and Craythorne v. Swinburne; though Lord Eldon has, and not without reason,
intimated some regret that the Courts of Law have assumed juris-

diction on this subject on account of the difficulties in doing full
justice between the parties.
Id. at 168, 151 Eng. Rep. at 371.
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case had first paid.2 8 This substitution was accomplished in the
absence of a novation or an assignment.
In most of the post-Hardwicke cases, 9 however, there was no
reference to Randal v. Cockrcan.'° Even in Blaauport v. Da Costa,'
a case arising under the same statute and, upon similar facts,
Randal was not mentioned. Nevertheless, the opinion of the Earl
of Northington reflects the statement of the law which was laid
down by Hardwicke in Randal.2 The Earl was,
of the opinion that upon the policy, and the peril happening, and the payment of the money by the underwriters,
the whole rights of the assured vested in them. The assured had this right of Restitution vested in them against
the Spanish captors, which were afterwards prosecuted
by the Crown by reprisals. Satisfaction having been
made in consequence of that capture, [he thought] the
plaintiffs are entitled to that benefit; and that it was
received by the executor of Elias de Paz in trust for
them.3
Up to this point in time, both equity and the common law had
avoided any reference to Randal or to Hardwicke. Nevertheless,
the substantive doctrine introduced by equity, and explained by
Hardwicke was being applied in every court both in equity and
in the common law.
RANVAL and Hardwicke Recognized as Authority for the Doctrine
In 1938 both Chief Justice Tindal and Justice Parke in Yates
v. Whyte 4 made it clear for the first time that the doctrine they
were applying was what had been previously laid down in Randal.
Chief Justice Tindal in his opinion held,
[tihat the insurers may recover in the name of the assured after he has been satisfied, appears from Randal v.
Cockran, where it was held that they had the plainest
35
Equity to institute such a suit.
28. See generally Copis v. Hiddleton, 37 Eng. Rep. 1083 (Turn. & R.
1823); Dowbiggin v. Bourne, 159 Eng. Rep. 927 (You. 1830);
Shaw, 3 My.&K. 183, 40 Eng. Rep. 70 (1834).

29. See note 28 supra.
30.

31.
32.

33.
34.
35.

1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748).
1 Eden. 130, 28 Eng. Rep. 633 (1758).
1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748).
1 Eden. at 131, 28 Eng. Rep. at 634.
4 Bing. N.C. 272, 132 Eng. Rep. 793 (1838).
Id. at 283, 132 Eng. Rep. at 797.
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Justice Parke added:
This point has been decided ever since the time of Lord
Hardwicke; so much so that it has been laid down in text
writers, that where the assured, who had been indemnified for a wrong, recovers from the wrongdoer, the insurers may recover the amount from the assured. 6
Justice Parke pushed the doctrine even further; he showed that
this rule was applicable both in equity and in the common law,
without a difference:
In Randal v. Cockran it was said they had the clearest
Equity to use the name of the assured, in order to reimburse themselves, and in Mason v. Sainsbury the
judges were all unanimous: they held indeed that the
insurers could not sue in their own names; but they confirmed the general doctrine, that the wrongdoer should
be ultimately liable, notwithstanding a payment by the
insurers."
The doctrine to which Parke made reference is the same theory
"every day the insurer is put in the
framed by Lord Mansfield;
13 8
place of the insured.1
Soon after Yates, the courts began to make reference to
Hardwicke and Randal with ease and confidence. In Whyte v.
Robinson,3 ' the Vice-Chancellor said: "My opinion is that this
case comes within the principle distinctly stated by Lord Hardwicke in Randal v. Cockran."'' He then quoted the principle, verbatim, from Hardwicke's opinion. Baron Parke paraphrased the
words of Hardwicke in another case because the issues should
have been decided "[a] ccording to the doctrine laid down by Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke in Randal v. Cockran.... "'"Clearly, Hardwicke through his decision in Randal was finally getting recognition as an authority on subrogation.
Other cases after Yates explicitly recognized Randal as the
beginning point of the doctrine. In Dickerson v. Jardine,42 the
36. ld.
37. Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
(1849).

Mason v. Sainsbury, 3 Doug. 61, 64, 99 Eng. Rep. 538, 540 (1782).
14 Sim. 273, 60 Eng. Rep. 363 (1844).
Id. at 274, 60 Eng. Rep. at 363.
Morgan v. Price, 4 Exch. 615, 620-21, 154 Eng. Rep. 1360, 1362

42. L.R. 3 C.P. 639 (1868).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/4
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plaintiff, a cargo owner, sued the defendant his insurer, under a
policy which included jettison 3 as one of the perils insured against.
The plaintiff, his cargo having been jettisoned, commenced the
action against the insurers before seeking general average contribution" from the other cargo owners. Defendant (the insurer)
argued that the action could not be brought unless the general
average contribution was first sought. In rejecting that argument, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed
against the insurer notwithstanding that general average contribution had not been sought first. The court reasoned that once
the insurer pays pursuant to the policy, he becomes entitled to
stand in the place of the assured with respect to the general
average contribution. The court drew support for its decision
from Randal:
It has been settled since the case of Randal v. Cocran...
that the underwriters having indemnified the assured,
whatever the assured received from the commissioners
must be held by them as trustees for the underwriters."'
The right of the insurer in Dickerson to get the benefit of the
assured's right to general average contribution clearly was traced
back to Randal.
The next case of considerable importance was Rankin v. Potter, 6 in which the court rested its opinion on the equitable doctrine of subrogation as laid down by Hardwicke.
There is no notice of abandonment in cases of fire . . .
insurance, but the salvage is transferred on the principle
of Equity, expressed by Lord Hardwicke, in Randal v.
Cockran that the person who originally sustains the loss
was the owner, but, after satisfaction made to him, the
insurer.47
43. Jettison is the intentional casting overboard of any part of a venture exposed to peril, whether it be of the cargo, or of the ship's furniture
or tackle, in the hope of saving the rest of the venture.
44. General average contribution is a principle of maritime law. When
it is decided by a master of a vessel, acting for all the interests concerned,
to sacrifice any part of the venture exposed to a common and imminent peril
in order to save the rest, the interests saved are compelled to contribute
ratably to the owner of the interest sacrificed so that the cost will fall equally
among them.
45. L.R. 3 C.P. at 643-44.
46. L.R. 6 H.L. 83 (1873).
47. Id. at 118-19.
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There were many tangential references to both Hardwicke
and Randal in a number of cases prior to Yates. But after Yates
there was express judicial recognition of both Hardwicke and
Randal as the sources for the proposition that the insurer succeeds
to the rights of the assured once payment is made.
Hardwicke's Doctrine is Named Subrogation fluence

The French In-

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the theory behind
Randal had received wide acceptance in both English equity and
common law courts. They were daily engaged in its application
as a method by which a litigant could obtain reimbursement, but
the idea had yet to acquire universal application or a name.
Possibly the English looked to other jurisdictions which had
a similar kind of equitable doctrine to name the English concept.
However, English case law up to 1850 does not suggest that the
courts had recognized the existence of a similar equitable remedy
in the French law. Admittedly, there were some basic differences
between the two doctrines, but the similarities were nonetheless
clear and numerous. Furthermore, the corresponding French remedy was more than coincidentally labeled subrogation.
The French traced their remedy without hesitation to Roman
subrogation.48 However, the French concept was actually more
similar to the Roman doctrine of cessio actionum. Renusson in
Traite de la Subrogation9 noted this similarity:
It is necessary to observe that the term "cession" is a
common and equivocal term that includes many different
things. The name "cession" is given to the transfer of a
debt, to the delegation, the subrogation, and the voluntary transference of a debtor's goods to his creditors,
and to the cession of wealth that a debtor does in Law
to obtain his freedom of his person. All these things are
different: nonetheless they are often called "cession." As
this may cause errors and mistakes and because it has
already created some confusion in the textbooks of Roman
Law it is necessary to explain their differences."
Thus, Renusson recognized that cession meant a variety of things,
and therefore the Roman texts were confused. But Renusson elimi48. Yates v. Whyte, 4 Bing. N.C. 272, 132 Eng. Rep. 793 (1838), and
note 34 supra and accompanying text.
49.

RENUSSON, TRAITE DE LA SUBROGATION (Paris ed. 1760).

50.

Id. at Ch. II, Section 1 at 4.
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nated the confusion as far as the French law was concerned when
he noted that,
[t] he transfer of a debt is what is properly called a cession. The two terms are ordinarily joined together and
we commonly say cession and transfer in order to distinguish from a simple cession of action that we call
subrogation. Cession and transfer are true sales which
are made by a creditor who disposes of what is owed to
him; and it is so called in the textbooks of Roman Law.'
However, it must be stressed that the law discussed by Renusson was similar to the assignment or novation originally required
for subrogation by the English common law. The French, howver, based their requirement of an express act of transference upon
cessio actionum. The English common law had difficulties with the
need to observe both the principles of privity and consideration.
It was these difficulties that equity had succeeded in circumventing by the nineteenth century.
In 1851, the Privy Council had Quebec Fire Insurance Corapany v. Augustin St. Louis and John Molson" before them, on
appeal from the Court of Appeals of the Province of Lower Canada. This case requires careful analysis because it appears to be
the first case where the French concept of "subrogation" was
used. The respondent's servants were held negligent in causing a
fire which partially destroyed a parish church. The appellants,
as insurers, paid pursuant to the insurance policy. In consideration of this payment, the priest and the Marguilliers-in-charge
transferred to the appellants by a notarial instrument the right
to sue the respondents for the amount paid.
By virtue of this transference of rights, the insurers commenced action against the original tortfeasors. The Court of Appeals of Lower Canada reversed the judgment of the Court of
Queen's Bench for the District of Montreal on the ground that
there had been no subrogation of the insurers to the rights of
the assured. The court held that the action was not maintainable
by the insurers in their own right or under rights derived from
the assured. 3 The insurance company then appealed to the Privy
Council. On appeal, the Privy Council held that the notarial instrument had the capacity to transfer to the insured the rights
which the assured held against the respondents.
51.
52.

Id. at Ch. II, Section 2 at 4-5.
7 Moo. P.C. 286, 13 Eng. Rep. 891 (1851).

53. Id. at 297-99, 13 Eng. Rep. at 896.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1976
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In Quebec Fire, appellants relied on Pothier and his Coutumes
d'Orleans" for their argument. In that work, Pothier had enumerated four types of subrogation:
1) by operation of law;
2) by requisition with the creditor ;"5
3)

by contract between the creditor and a stranger who pays
a debt which in effect is a mere sale of the debt; and,

4)

by contract between the debtor and another who pays the
debt for him.

Appellants submitted that the issue fell into the second category.
They argued that, according to Pothier, the transference of rights
should take place before a notary so as to establish the intention
of the parties in relationship to the transference. In this respect,
it differed from subrogation by operation of law. Arguing that the
appeal should be permitted, appellants' counsel stated the principle that "an insurance company after paying for the damage done
has a right to be subrogated, as against the party causing the
damage, is laid down in every French textbook on Terrestrial
Assurance.""6
Baron Parke, who wrote the opinion of the court, relied heavily on the appellants' contentions. Parke, in accepting appellants'
arguments, stated that,
[a]n assuree, by a policy against maritime or terrestrial
risks, is clearly within the Equity of the rules, and has a
similar right to require a Subrogation at the time of the
payment of the loss. The authorities cited in support of
that position seem to us to establish that the assurees
have that right. .

.."

Baron Parke, in reference to authorities cited in appellants' argument, singled out Pothier's Treatise on Assurance. 8 In adopting
Pothier, Parke observed that,
54.

POTHIER, COUTUMES D'ORLEANS 66-69 (-).
55. By agreement with the creditor.
56. 7 Moo. P.C. at 303-04, 13 Eng. Rep. at 898. The passage appears
to be poorly written. It is suggested that the passage should read:
That an insurance company after paying for the damage done has a
right to be subrogated, as against the party causing the damage, is
now laid down in every French text on Terrestrial Assurance.
57. 7 Moo. P.C. at 316, 13 Eng. Rep. at 903.
58.

POTHIMER, TREATISE ON AssURANcE 248 (Fr. ed. 1810).
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in the case of a general average [contribution] the assurer, after having indemnified the assured against the
losses sustained for the common benefit, ought to be subrogated to the rights of the assured to the contribution,
which in such a case must be made. 9
Quebec Fire is important because it appears to be the first usage
of the word subrogation in an English court.
Subrogation, as discussed in Quebec Fire, is similar to the
Roman doctrine of cessio actionum.6" It differed from the English
doctrine expressed in Randal in that in Quebec Fire the express
act of cession was vital for the appellants' success. Baron Parke
appears to have recognized this point by refraining from associating the instant case or the newly acquired word "subrogation"
with Randal, in spite of the submission by appellants' counsel that
"[English law] has recognized the same principle in Randal v.
Cockran.,61

In succeeding years, the word "subrogation" and the decision
in Randal blended into a doctrine of subrogation applicable as
such in English law; Lord Hardwicke became accepted as its
founder. The odd aspect of this development was that the word
"subrogation," as later applied in English courts, appears to have
come from Quebec, with its roots more in French law than in
the English law of the time.
The exact source from which Quebec derived its law relating
to subrogation was not altogether clear. The general law of Lower
Canada was the French civil law after the passage of the Constitutional Act of 1791. This position remained unaffected in spite
of the act of union in 1840. It was, however, unclear which French
law was applicable until the decision of the Privy Council in
Hutchinson v. Gillespie."' There the Privy Council laid down that,
[t]he Ordonnances cited do not apply; they were never
registered, and it is a principle of the French Law that
all Ordonnances not registered are void. Registration
was necessary to give them authority. It is the check
which the Parliament of Paris had over the edicts of the
59. 7 Moo. P.C. at 316-17, 13 Eng. Rep. at 903.
60. The court was applying Quebec law and not the English law and
as such was applying the civil law concept of subrogation which was a derivative of Roman law.
61. 7 Moo. P.C. at 304, 13 Eng. Rep. at 898.

62. 4 Moo. P.C. 378, 13 Eng. Rep. 349 (1844).
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Crown. The Ordonnance of 1766 throughout assumes
registration to be necessary. The mere fact, therefore,
of the existence of certain Ordonnances is not sufficient
to make them in force in Canada. 3
That decision wiped out completely all the Ordonnances except the
Ordonnance Civile of 1667, which alone had received registration. 4 The view taken by the Privy Council in Hutchinson instigated a great debate among students of French and Quebec law.
But Article VIII of the Quebec Act of 1774 provided some clarification by recognizing non-registered Ordonnances as a part of
the customary law of Quebec. This automatically revived the nonregistered Ordonnances, which then became a significant source
of law.
Until 1866, the law applicable in Quebec came largely from
the Coutume d'Paris. These were compiled in 1510, reformed in
1580, and were constantly interpreted with the aid of French
commentators like Dumoulin and, at a later stage, by Ferriere
and Pothier. It is therefore possible that the Ordonnance Civile
of 1667 represented the Coutume d'Paris. It was on this Coutume
that Quebec's law of subrogation was based.
Baron Parke, in Quebec Fire, failed to indicate the precise
source of the word "subrogation."" However, he was correct in
asserting that it did not come from the Code Napoleon. It was
obvious to Parke that the concept of subrogation had not been derived "as was suggested in argument from the Code Napoleon
which is not in force in Canada.""6
It will be seen that subrogation had a smooth passage into
English law. The succeeding English cases gave not the slighest
indication that it was received from a foreign legal system where
the word was used to connote a meaning different from what
both equity and Lord Hardwicke envisaged. The contemporary
doctrine of subrogation appears, therefore, to have had its birth
in equity, to have been nurtured by both equity and the common
law, and to have been named after a French doctrine.
63. Id. at 385, 13 Eng. Rep. at 352.
64. The following Ordonnances were regarded as void:
i. Ordonnance Sur La Marine, Louis XV;
ii. Ordonnance Sur Les Testaments, 1735;
iii. Ordonnance Sur Les Donations, 1731;
iv. Ordonnance Sur Les Substitutions Fides Commissires, 1747.
See CASTEL, THE -CIVIL LAw SYSTEM IN THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC 12-16 (-).
65. 7 Moo. P.C. 286, 13 Eng. Rep. 891 (1851).
66. 7 Moo. at 317, 13 Eng. Rep. at 903.
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APPLICATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINE

The first English case to adopt the word "subrogation" was
Stringer v. The English and Scotch Marine Insurance Co." In this
case, the plaintiffs insured a ship cargo with the defendants for
"taking at sea, arrests, restraints, and detainment of all Kings,
princes and people." The ship was subsequently captured by a
United States cruiser and taken into New Orleans, where a suit
for its condemnation was instituted. The plaintiffs contested the
action successfully and the captors appealed. The court ordered
the plaintiffs to furnish security against costs which they could
not afford. As a result, the ship was condemned, the plaintiffs
gave formal notice of abandonment of the cargo, and requested
the insurers pay for their total loss.
The court, in holding for the plaintiff, noted that the plaintiff as the assured was free to choose between defending the appeal before the American court or claiming a loss under the
policy. Because the assured chose the latter, the insurers were
obligated to pay. However, having paid, the insurers were entitled
"to be subrogated to them, and get what they can out of the hands
of the Americans for their own benefit."68 Significantly, the authorities which were cited in support of the application of subrogation were Randal v. Cockran,9 Mason v. Sainsbury0 and Yates
v. Whyte."
Other cases contemporaneous to Stringer completely avoided
the use of the new word. Two years later, in North of England Insurance Association v. Armstrong,2 the insurers paid £6000 to the
insured pursuant to the policy. The insurers then sued the original
tortfeasors for the damage caused to the insureds' ship. In that
action £5683 was awarded to the insured. The insured claimed
£3000 of that sum, on the grounds that the real value of their loss
was £9000. The Court of Appeals was unanimous in refusing the
shipowners' claim. The important aspect of this decision was that
none of the judges made any reference to subrogation or to Randal.
However, the court did indicate that the doctrine was at least applicable in theory at "the moment [the underwriter] is called upon
to satisfy the exigency of the policy, and he does satisfy it."7
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

L.R. 4 Q.B. 676 (1868-69).
Id. at 692.
1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748).
3 Doug. 61, 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (1782).
4 Bing. N.C. 272, 132 Eng. Rep. 793 (1838).

72.
73.

L.R. 5 Q.B. 244 (1870).
Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
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The court's opinion highlighted the ipso jure nature of the doctrine. However, it is interesting that the headnote 4 of the case
used the word "subrogation," despite the fact that the word does
not appear in the opinion. At least from Armstrong, it is difficult to determine exactly what connotation the English courts intended by the use of the word "subrogation."
The meaning of subrogation became much more clearly defined in Darrell v. Tibbitts.7s In Darrell, Forbes owned a house
which he leased. The lease placed the duty upon the lessee to
make repairs in the event of an explosion. An explosion occurred,
due to the negligence of an employee of the Brighton Corporation.
The lessee made the repairs and the corporation reimbursed him.
The lessor then sold the house to Tibbitts with the benefit of the
insurance policy. The insurer (plaintiff), without knowledge of
the payment made to the original lessee by the Brighton Corporation, paid the new owner pursuant to the policy. Subsequently,
the insurers became aware of the first payment and sought to recover it. The insurers lost in the trial court but successfully appealed. In the opinion, Lord Justice Brett clearly stated the doctrine of subrogation as it applied to insurance:
The doctrine is well established that where something
is insured against loss either in a marine or a fire policy,
after the assured has been paid by the insurers for the
loss, the insurers are put into the place of the assured
with regard to every right given to him by the law respecting the subject matter insured. .. .""
Having thus stated the principle, the learned Lord Justice applied
the principle to the facts of the case:
So that immediately after the insurance company had
paid the landlord, they were put into his place with regard to the contract to rebuild, which was a contract respecting the subject-matter insured, that is, the building,
and which contract was affected by the safety, or the loss
of that building by reason of the explosion, which was a
peril insured against, and therefore they are to be subrogated or to be put into the place of the landlord with
regard to his rights; they might have sued in his name
the tenants if the latter had not repaired, and when the
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 244.
5 Q.B.D. 560 (1880).
Id. at 563.
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tenants have repaired, the insurance company are to have
the benefit of those repairs.""
Subrogation, as applied in Darrell, is identical with the doctrine
as laid down by Lord Hardwicke and those who came after him.
The payment is the crucial event; once that is made, the payor
slips automatically into the shoes of the payee. Darrell v. Tibbitts"8 clearly demonstrates how subrogation was then to be used.
Lord Justice Thesieger, in the same decision, gave a similar
interpretation to subrogation. He said:
It is also maintainable as a kind of suit in Equity founded
upon the following grounds; the assured having been indemnified against the loss sustained by him through the
payment by the insurance company, the latter has a right
to be subrogated into the place of the assured. .

..

"

Thesieger's dictum carries a somewhat deeper significance in that
he related the word "subrogation" to equity, upon which he bases
its origin and validity.
In Castellain v. Preston,0 the word "subrogation" was explicitly applied to insurance law. In Castellain, a vendor who had
insured his house against fire was in the process of selling this
house. After the contract of sale was executed, but before the
actual transfer was made, a fire destroyed the house. The vendee,
nonetheless, paid the full and previously agreed upon purchase
price. The insurer, who had no knowledge of the sale, paid the
vendor damages pursuant to the policy. After the facts surrounding the sale became known, the insurer sued the vendor for return
of the money paid.
The court refused the action on the ground that the insurer
was claiming a right to be subrogated to a contract between the
insured and a third party which did not exist at the time of
maturity of the insurance policy.' The court observed that "the
contract should be one which subsists at the time when the claim
under the policy of insurance has been matured." 2 The insurers,
however, appealed. The Court of Appeals83 in reversing the lower
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
5 Q.B.D. 560 (1880).
Id. at 568.
8 Q.B.D. 613 (1881-82).
Id. at 615-26.
Id. at 625.
Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380 (1883).
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court's decision, stated what they termed the fundamental principle of insurance law:
The very foundation . . . of every rule which has been
applied to insurance law is . . . that the contract of in-

surance contained in the marine or fire policy is a contract of indemnity, and of indemnity only, and that this
contract means that the assured, in case of a loss against
which the policy has been made, shall be fully indemnified but shall never be more than fully indemnified. That
"
is the fundamental principle of insurance ...
In Randal v. Cockran,5 Hardwicke, by making the insured a
trustee for the insurer after payment was made, achieved exactly
the same result. The insured, after receiving payment for his loss
from the insurer, would be getting a windfall if he were allowed
to retain payments which he subsequently received from other
sources, in respect of the same loss. The fact that he received the
latter payments as a trustee for the insurer prevented him from
being "more than fully indemnified." This appears to have been
the aim of Hardwicke and is indeed the aim of subrogation.
The court in Quebec Fire Insurance Co. v. St. Louis 6 also
adopted the contemporary theory of subrogation and readily applied it to insurance problems. The court, after stressing the
necessity of the notice of abandonment ' to the insurer, only mentioned it,
for the purpose of coming to the doctrine of Subrogation.
That doctrine does not arise upon any of the terms of
the contract of insurance; it is only for the proposition
which has been adopted for the purpose of carrying out
the fundamental rules which [was mentioned] . . . in

order to prevent the assured from recovering more than
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 386.
1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748).
7 Moo. P.C. 286, 13 Eng. Rep. 891 (1851).
The requirement to give notice of abandonment is necessary to

maintain the indemnity character of a contract of insurance. It is the assured
who knows the condition of the vessel, and if it is a "constructive total loss"
(if the cost of repairs is likely to exceed the repaired value of the vessel),

then the assured must give notice of abandonment to the insurer at once.
Thereafter the assured may claim an "actual total loss." See Kaltenbach v.
Mackenzie, 3 C.P.D. 467 (1878) and Dave v. The Mortgage Insurance Corp.,
1 Q.B. 54 (1894), where the doctrine of abandonment received the most care-

ful examination by Lord Justice Brett.
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a full indemnity; it has been adopted solely for that
88
reason.
Lord Justice Bowen, in the same case, clarified the relationship
of subrogation to the principle of indemnity for "subrogation is
itself only the particular application of the principle of indemnity
to a special subject matter. . . .""
Having discussed the true
nature of the rights to which the insurer could subrogate, Lord
Justice Bowen concluded that "[t]he true test is, can the right
to be insisted on be deemed to be one that enforcement of which
will diminish the loss ?,,9o
The purpose of contemporary subrogation and the purpose
of Hardwicke's principle had thus begun to conicide. Therefore,
the utilization of the word "subrogation" by English lawyers to
denote the equitable doctrine laid down by Hardwicke was a
natural development.
EXPANSION OF THE CONTEMPORARY SUBROGATION DOCTRINE

Once the judges began to trace their authority to Hardwicke"'
and began to freely use their newly acquired word, it became
necessary to elaborate and clarify the doctrine which was firmly
established in English law.
New openings in the field of commerce as a result of colonial
expansions and the increase of markets are factors which greatly
influenced the doctrine. For these reasons, the mid-nineteenth
century is significant for its increase in commercial litigation.
Soon after Quebec Fire Insurance Co. v. St. Louis,92 the doctrine of subrogation underwent changes and expansion in response to the new commercial needs of England. Cases emphasized that the doctrine of subrogation did not permit the insurer
to do better than the assured could have. In Simpson and Company v. Thomson, Burrell,3 Mr. Burrell owned two ships which
were insured with Thomson. The two ships collided and, as a
result, the insured paid the assured under the policy of insurance.
The assured sought to limit his liability for claims arising from
that collision to £3590. In the present action by the cargo owners,
the insurer claimed to stand in pari passu with them, claiming
88.
89.
90.
91.

92.
93.

Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380, 387 (1883).
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Randal v. Cockran, 1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748).
7 Moo. P.C. 286, 13 Eng. Rep. 891 (1851).
3 App. Cas. 279 (1877).
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that he was entitled to recover from the assured the loss that he
had incurred under the policy as a result of the accident.
In holding that the insurer could not use such a remedy, the
court noted that the insurer had no right independent of the rights
of the assured. The insurer, therefore, could enforce only those
rights which the assured had. The court decided that the assured
was the owner of both vessels, and therefore it could not be said
that the assured held a right against himself.
Nowhere in the opinion of the court does the word "subrogation" appear. But the following passage is surely the epitome of
that doctrine:
I know of no foundation for the right of the underwriters,
except the well known principle of law, that where one
person has agreed to indemnify another, he will on making good the indemnity, be entitled to succeed to all the
ways and means by which the person indemnified might
have protected himself against or reimbursed himself for
the loss.""
Thereafter, the learned Lord Chancellor proceeded to point out
that "if the person insured, be the person who has caused the
damage . . . ,"I then no right was available to the insurer to succeed and prosecute to reduce the loss which he had incurred.
The case established the central theme of subrogation. What
the insurer acquires by way of subrogation are the rights of the
assured, and no more. And, therefore, if the assured had no
rights, there is nothing which the insurer could acquire by
subrogation.
On the other hand, it is the existence of such rights in the
assured which could be enforced to his benefit, which gave rise
to the classic principle that the assured should not be more than
fully indemnified. Subrogation will not permit a windfall. The
assured must have rights which could be enforced to his benefit;
otherwise subrogation is inapplicable, as emphasized in Simpson v.
Thomson, Burrell.9 6
In Burnand v. Rodocanachi,'" another aspect of subrogation
came up for adjudication. The Confederate cruiser "Alabama"
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 284.
Id.
Id. at 279.
7 App. Cas. 333 (1882).
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had destroyed the respondent's cargo which was insured with the
appellants. The appellants paid the respondents under the war
risks clause of the policy. Subsequently, the United States Congress
passed an act under which the United States was empowered to pay
the difference between the real loss and the sum received from insurance companies to those who had suffered through the activities of war. As a result of this Act of Congress, the respondents
received a sum of money which the insurance company claimed
in its action.
To support their claim, the insurance company presented the
classic argument that having indemnified the assured, they were
entitled to stand in his place for every benefit that may subse8
quently fall upon him. Randal v. Cockran"
and Blaauwport v.
Da Costa"' figured prominently in their argument. The opinion
of the court referred to them as authorities. The conclusion, which
was unanimous, was that the insurer had no claim to the money.
The next significant contribution came from Lord Justice
Brett in Castellainv. Preston.'0 The Lord Justice first enunciated
what he believed to be the fundamental principle of insurance
law, namely, the principle of indemnity.' ' Thereafter, he clarified
the doctrine of subrogation in the following passage:
In order to apply the doctrine of Subrogation, it seems
to me that the full and absolute meaning of the word
must be used, that is to say, the insurer must be placed
in the position of the assured. Now it seems to me that
in order to carry out the fundamental rule of Insurance
Law, this doctrine of Subrogation must be carried to the
extent which I am now about to endeavor to express,
namely, that as between the underwriter and the assured
the underwriter is entitled to the advantage of every right
of the assured, whether such right consists in contract,
fulfilled or unfulfilled, or in remedy for tort capable of
being insisted on or already insisted on, or in any other
right, whether by way of condition or otherwise, legal or
equitable, which can be, or has been exercised or has accrued, and whether such right could or could not be enforced by the insurer in the name of the assured, by the
exercise or acquiring of which right or condition the loss
98. 1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748).
99. 1 Eden. 130, 28 Eng. Rep. 633 (1758).
100. 11 Q.B.D. 380 (1883).
101. Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380, 386 (1883).
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against which the assured is insured, can be, or has been
diminished.'"2
To ensure that he had omitted nothing which would help in representing the doctrine in its widest form, he added:
That [it] seems to me to put this doctrine of Subrogation in the largest possible form, and if in that form,
large as it is, it is short of fulfilling that which is the
fundamental condition, I must have omitted to state something which ought to have been stated." 3
This statement of the law is regarded as a locus classicus pertaining to subrogation.
In succeeding decades, Randal v. Cockran.°4 was certainly referred to, but the bulk of the case law that developed in both
equity and common law courts rendered it less significant. Both
judges and jurists cared very little for the explanation by Lord
Hardwicke of how equity could justify its activities, if called upon
to do so, in this field. For such an explanation had become superfluous by the middle of the nineteenth century. Be that as it may,
the importance of Lord Hardwicke's explanation to this inquiry
is immeasurable, because it shows how one could explain the theory
behind the workings of equity in this field. This in turn has shown
how the ipso jure transference of rights was brought about so as
to establish the doctrine of subrogation. As has been previously
stressed, this constitutes the major difference between cessio
actionum and subrogation.
No further exposition of the doctrine was made until 1962.
In Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nisbet Shipping Co.,' °5 the
court had a very modern problem before them-the effect of
monetary devaluation on subrogation. The plaintiff insured the
defendant's vessel for £72,000. Due to the negligence of those
who manned a Canadian ship, a collision resulted and the insured's ship became a total loss. The insurer paid fully upon
the policy of insurance and, with the insurer's consent, the insured sued the Canadian government. As a result of that action,
the insured was awarded $336,039.52, which was equivalent to
£75,514.9.11d sterling. At this stage the pound sterling was devalued, and when the Canadian dollars were exchanged they
102.

Id. at 388.

103. Id.
104. 1 Ves. sen. 98, 27 Eng. Rep. 916 (1748).
105. [1962] 2 Q.B. 330.
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yielded a sum of £126,971.1411d sterling. The insurer claimed
this increased sum was the payment they had made under the
policy, while the insured argued that the sum payable was £72,000,
and the balance which
was £55,000, should go to them.
I
The court found for the insured on the ground that the insurer cannot recover more than the sum he had actually paid the
insured. Three passages from the court's opinion are worthy of
comment. First,
[t] he doctrine of Subrogation is not restricted to the law
of insurance. Although often referred to as an "equity"
it is not an exclusively equitable doctrine. It was applied
by the Common Law Courts in insurance cases long before the fusion of law and equity.... 0' 6
It is the belief of this writer that the doctrine of subrogation is
not restricted to insurance cases. The doctrine, as suggested, is a
general doctrine, which may be applicable in cases meriting contribution, such as between co-sureties, co-trustees, co-partners, and
joint tortfeasors. It may also be suggested that the doctrine of
subrogation, in an extended form, could be used to cut through
the limitations placed on the contractual capacities of certain
legal persons.0 7
To that extent, the observations of the court in Nisbet Shipping appear to be eminently correct. But what is clearly wrong
is to preach that the doctrine was not exclusively equitable. For
it has already been adequately demonstrated' 0 ' that long before
the first common law case' 9 accepted this doctrine, it was firmly
established as a restitutory remedy in equity.
Second,
[i]f, before the insurer has paid under the policy, the
assured recovers from some third party a sum in excess
of the actual amount of the loss, he can recover nothing
from the insurer because he has sustained no loss, but it
has never been suggested that the insurer can recover
from the assured the amount of the excess.'"
106. Id. at 339.
107. E.g., companies, infants, married women and insane persons.

108. See 10 VAL. U.L. REv. 45 (1975).
109.
110.

Mason v. Sainsbury, 3 Doug. 61, 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (1782).
Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nisbet Shipping Co., [1962] 2 Q.B.

330, 340.
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This doctrine appears to cut both ways. In one way, unless the
insurer pays pursuant to the policy, there is no loss which he has
sustained and therefore there arises no right of recovery. In another way, it limits the right of recovery to the exact amount the
insurer pays to the assured. This means that by the operation of
this doctrine neither the insurer nor the assured could make a
profit from the other's loss.
And third, the following is noteworthy from Diplochs' opinion,
[i] n the action brought in the name of the assured, pursuant to the equitable remedy, it is the assured who recovers judgment against the third party, and the judgment can be satisfied only by payment to him. When he
receives it, the insurer can recover from him at common
law, as money had and received, such sum as he has overpaid to the assured under the contract of insurance."'
In this passage, the court points out that the primary right is in
the assured. It is he who could give a discharge in an action
brought in a matter connected with the insurance policy. The
question which this raises is how the money, once paid, could be
recovered from the assured. Under common law, the money could
be recovered as money had and received. This statement is important for the fact that the court recognized the absence of a
right in contract or in tort, which the insurer may use against
the assured. It is this absence of a right in contract or in tort
which led to the application of a trust in equity by Hardwicke.
Common law found it difficult to accept an explanation based on
the trust, and therefore the remedy of "money had and received"
was put forward.
CONCLUSION

The examination of the common law doctrine of subrogation
and its civil law counterpart, cessio actionum, has revealed several
similarities and distinctions. The most obvious similarity between
the two is that both doctrines impart a transfer of rights from
one person to another. The distinctions between the two doctrines,
however, are less obvious. This historical development of cessio
actionum can be traced back as far as Roman sources. However,
the English doctrine of subrogation is a "local" creation. Its beginnings may be found in equity, particularly during the Chancellorship of Hardwicke. One specific distinction between the two
111.

Id. at 341-42.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/4

Marasinghe: An Historical Introduction to the Doctrine of Subrogation: The Ea

19761

DOCTRINE OF SUBROGATION

doctrines is found in the manner in which rights are transferred
from one person to another. At common law, subrogation applies
ipso jure without any requirement of any express agreement to
transfer rights. In contrast, however, in cessio actionum an express agreement to transfer rights must always precede the payment. Summarizing, what one witnesses in subrogation is an application of equity, where as what one witnesses in cessio actionum
is the enforcement of a simple contract between two parties.
While distinctions between the two doctrines exist, they have
often become muddled and confused through the historical development of subrogation. For example, in 1851 the word subrogation entered the language of the common law in the opinion of
the Privy Council in Quebec Fire Insurance Co. v. Augustin, St.
Louis and John Molson."2 In that case, the term subrogation was
used in a context which required an express agreement to transfer the rights of one party to another. In other words, in that
decision subrogation was used synonymously with cessio actionum.
However, since 1851, the English courts have used the term subrogation as associated with the particular application of equity,
and not within the narrower application of cessio actionum.
In the final analysis, it is the view of this writer that the
term subrogation was borrowed from a foreign system of jurisprudence, which had no capability of either comprehending or
applying the particular remedy which equity made available to an
indemnifier. Additionally, the failure of the common law courts
to recognize the antecedents of this particular remedy has resulted
in a distortion of the fact that subrogation is clearly an equitable
remedy. It is the belief of this writer that subrogation is one of
the remedial aspects of the constructive trust. It is his hope that
he shall succeed in establishing that fact in a subsequent writing.

112.

7 Moo. P.C. 286, 18 Eng. Rep. 891 (1851).
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